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NOTES
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT'
SECTION 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws "Every contract, combination
. . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . ," and Section 2,
less often used as the basis of litigation, is directed at "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize ..... I Although prosecution
and conviction under Section 1 is not unfamiliar, the extent to which the
first part of Section 2 is a bar to monopoly power achieved without combina-
tion or conspiracy has been infrequently tested. But the long-awaited deci-
sion in the suit of the Government against the Aluminum Company of
America,2 better known as "Alcoa," supplies hopeful evidence that the sec-
tion has become an effective device to preserve and restore competitive
conditions in American industry.
Control of the two patents which had made the commercial production of
aluminum feasible 3 gave Alcoa a complete and legally-sanctioned monopoly
of the "virgin" aluminum ingot market in this country from 1889 to 1909.
But when, after the expiration of the second patent in 1909, Alcoa continued
to be "the sole domestic producer of virgin aluminum ingot" despite abor-
tive attempts of others to enter the field, the Government sought and ob-
tained in 1912 a consent decree which declared void existing restrictive con-
tracts between Alcoa and other companies and enjoined Alcoa from entering
into any restrictive agreements the effect of which would be to restrain com-
merce in bauxite, alumina, or aluminum, or to fix and regulate the prices of
goods manufactured from aluminum. 4 In 1937 the Government brought a
civil suit against Alcoa charging it with monopolizing interstate commerce
in the manufacture and sale of virgin aluminum ingot and praying that it be
dissolved.5 Four years and 40,000 pages of testimony were consumed in the
district court proceedings and resulted in a dismissal of the complaint.
After a delay of almost two additional years the Supreme Court (unable to
hear the case because less than six justices considered themselves qualified)
referred the Government's appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,'
* United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945),
rev'g 44 F. Supp. 97 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-2 (1940).
2. United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
See Note (1945) 45 CoL. L. REv. 655.
3. Id. at 422.
4. SHALE, DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTi-TRUST CASES (1918) 341.
5. United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
6. An appeal was taken by the Government from the decision of the lower court and
allowed on Sept. 15, 1942. The Supreme Court certified the case to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit under the provisions of 15 U. S. C. § 29 (Supp. 1945).
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which has now reversed the dismissal and found Alcoa guilty of violating
both Sections 1 and 2.
In a far-reaching opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the possession of
monopoly power is held to constitute, without more, a violation of Section 27
The court points out that, since price-fixing contracts are unconditionally
illegal under Section 1,' it would be absurd to permit the existence of a
monopoly possessing an even greater power to fm pricesP Moreover, the
Sherman Act was passed to "put an end to" existing monopolies and to
prevent the growth of future concentrations. 0 Therefore, the questions of
"abuse" of monopoly power," "intent" to monopolize,12 indulgence in
"predatory" practices, 13 and "exclusion" of competitors 14 are dismissed as
irrelevant. But, although the court is not misled by the oft-repeated dictum
of earlier Sherman Act cases that "mere size" is not an offense,15 it suggests
7. The court decided that" 'Alcoa's' control over the ingot market must be reckoned
at over ninety percent." 148 F. (2d) at 425. "That percentage is enough to constitute a mo-
nopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly
thirty-three percent is not." Id. at 424.
8. Price fixing contracts have been declared unconditionally illegal under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 397-3 (1927); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 220-4 (1940).
9. 148 F. (2d) at 428. ". . . if the earlier stages are proscribed, when they are parts
of a plan, the mere projecting of which condemns them unconditionally, the realization of
the plan itself must also be proscribed." Ibid.
10. Id. at 427, 428.
11. Alcoa's plea that she did not "abuse" her position provides no basis for immunity,
since Congress did not differentiate between "good" and "bad" trusts when it paszed the
Sherman Act. 148 F. (2d) at 427.
12. The court makes the point that where monopoly is achieved there is always "in-
tent," "for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." Id. at 432. For
indications that "intent is not an essential element in the offense of monopoly" see HALE,
TNEC REP., A STuDY OF TEM CONSTRUCTION AND ENFoncEmENT oF TaE FEDERAL A;n-
TRusT LAWS, Monograph 38 (1941) 78.
13. "Proof of the improper exercise of monopoly power is not a prerequisite of illegal-
ity." HA MDLER, supra note 12, at 79; see Handler, Industrial Mergers and tie Anti-Trust
Laws (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 179, 251-2.
14. To Alcoa's contention that there must be actual "exclusion" before a violation of
Section 2 exists, the court replied to the effect that an inevitable consequence of economic
power based on control of a large part of a market is to make the entry of new producer
more and more difficult. 148 F. (2d) at 431.
15. Perhaps the most extreme ex\pressions of this view may be found in United States .
United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451, 460 (1920); United States v. International
Harvester Corp., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,
247 U. S. 32, 56 (1918). In his opinion in United States v. Svift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 116
(1932), Justice Cardozo said, "Mere size, according to the holding of this court, is not an
offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a
monopoly (United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417; United States v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708), but size carries with it an opportunity for abuce
that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past."
This dictum probably correctly interprets the decisions in the Stcl and International Har-
vester cases, which for the most part have been mistakenly cited in support of the doctrine
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that an exception may exist in favor of a firm that has monopoly "thrust
upon it." 16
By applying the Act as an instrument of economic policy, the court dem-
onstrates that it is no longer a vague code of business ethics designed only
to punish practices viewed by the judges as predatory or immoral. 17 From
this point of view the Sherman Act is a means of assuring at least as large a
measure of competition in the organization of trade and industry as is com-
patible with considerations of technological efficiency;", and its thorough
enforcement will assist in protecting society against depression,19 and in
raising the standard of living through steady decreases in prices and in-
creases in production.2" In terms of these purposes there is no difference
between a monopoly achieved by aggressive combination, by patent, by
that "mere size" even magnified to the point of monopoly does not constitute a violation of
the statute.
16. 148 F. (2d) at 429.
17. See Chief Justice White's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1
(1911); HANDLER, supra note 12, at 80; Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics (1937)
47 YALE L. J. 34.
18. The problem of determining the size of the units that are consistent both with the
policy of a competitive society and the desire for maximum technological efficiency is a
difficult one. See Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistic Size
(1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 615; WALLACE, MARKET CONTROL IN THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY
(1937) 81; Arnold, The Policy of Government Toward Big Business (1939) 18 ACAD. OF PoL.
Sci. PROC. 180; WiLcox, TNEC REP. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUS-
TRY, Monograph 21 (1940) passim, especially at 309-14; RUSSELL, THE DISINTEGRATION oF
MONOPOLY (1913) passim; SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE (1934) 38,
n. 5.; Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trust Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Deci.
sions (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1339, 1343; Wallace, Industrial Markets and Public Policy:
Some Major Problems in PUBLIC POLICY: 1940 (1940) 59, 61, 100-5. But cf. United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106 (1932).
There are indications that many of our modern monopolistic industries are many times
the size of the most efficient unit. See Wncox, supra; Rostow, American Security and For-
eign Economic Policy (1945) 34 YALE RE iEW 495, 518; Note (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 677, 680.
But see CRUM, CORPORATE SIZE AND EARNING POWER (1939) passim, especially at 7-8.
For indications that Alcoa has probably exceeded the optimum point in its development see
WALLACE, op. cit. supra note 18, c. 10.
19. See Edwards, The Relation of Price Policy to Fluctuations of Investment (1938) 28
Ai. EcoN. REv. Supp. 56; Mason, Price Policies and Full Employment in PUBLIC POLIcY:
1940 (1940) 25; Simons, Economic Stability and Antitrust Policy (1944) 11 U. of CII. L.
REv. 338. For the final report of the Temporary National Economic Committee see SEN.
Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 1-30; for President Franklin D. Roosevelt's mes-
sage to Congress see SEN. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Enforcement of the
Sherman Act will also avoid placing an excessive or impossible burden of initiative on gov-
ernment during depressions. See SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAIssEz FAIRE (1934)
3, 11.
20. BURNS, TEE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) cc. 1, 11; NOURSE AND DRURY, IN-
DUSTRIAL PRICE POLICIES AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1938) passim, especially at 86-9 and,
for a price history of Alcoa, at 176-83, 202-13; Brief for Appellants, pp. 186-207, United
States v Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Wallace, op. cit.
supra note 18, passim, especially cc. 10, 11; Nourse, Monopolistic Practices and the Price
Structure (1939) 18 AcAD. OF POL. ScI. PROC. 133; EZEKEIL, $2500 A YEAR (1936); EZEICIEL,
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natural growth, or by accident. The objectionable consequences of monopoly
power arise from its mere existence, not from the manner in which market
control has been obtained. It is therefore unfortunate that, despite its
adoption of an essentially economic test of the illegality of monopolies, the
court has seen fit to outline certain possible limitations in the applicability
of Section 2.21 Judge Hand suggests that "the courts have at least kept in
reserve the possibility that the origin of a monopoly may be critical in
determining its legality," and credits these "compunctions" to the possi-
bility that "persons may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a
monopoly . . ." Three cases are visualized: a "market . . .so limited
that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of production except
by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand," "changes in taste or
in cost which drive out all but one purveyor," and the survival of a single
producer "out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his su-
perior skill, foresight and industry." 22 Something might be said for such
exceptions, at least in the case of a criminal prosecution,O were it not that
they are couched in the vague language with which courts have for years
dogged the steps of antitrust enforcement. It is only to be expected that
offenders will make every effort to appear to come within one of these cate-
gories, and that courts, shrinking from the drastic alteration of existing busi-
ness relationships which the restoration of competitive conditions often
requires, 24 will tend to expand their scope.
It is not clear from the Alcoa case how the court would have defined mo-
nopoly if the facts before it had required a discriminating definition. But
the ways in which it did not define monopoly are suggestive of the criteria
which may be applied in the future to less obvious cases. First, although
the use of the word has sometimes been limited to instances in which a single
JOBS FOR ALL TnROUGH IimusTmRAL ExP.sioN (1939); MEAnS LN- WARE, Tim MODEM;
EcoNomy Lq AcTroN (1936).
21. "If the antitrust laws are to retain their potency, vigilance is necessary to prevent
their attrition by nibbling exceptions." HANDLER, supra note 12, at 35.
22. 148 F. (2d) at 429-30.
23. It is true that criminal penalties provided by the Act, especially the penal provi-
sions, have been rarely invoked. Nevertheless, the social stigma which attaches to a criminal
indictment has made courts reluctant to punish "pillars of the community" for busines
practices which are hardly associated with the usual connotations of the phraze "criminal
activities." Perhaps the solution to this particular problem lies in the complete divorce of
criminal actions and civil suits. Such a separation would not face a defendant ith the poZD-
bility of going to jail, when it is clear that his offense is one more amenable to a civil pro-
ceeding. Aside from the emotional and procedural difficulties involved, it is obviouzly im-
possible to remedy an economic situation by imposing criminal penalties. See H,%uL;O;
AND TILL, TNEC REP., ANTITRUTis IN ACTION, Monograph 16 (1940) 78-85. Criminal and
civil remedies may of course be pursued concurrently. See Berge, Rcmedies Arailatlc to the
Government under the Sherman Act (1940) 7 Lxw & CoN'rEmP. PROB. 104, 106.
24. The reluctance of judicial bodies to disturb existing businezs relationships, even
when in violation of the antitrust laws, is illustrated by the recent court decision in the ca-e
of Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 373 (U. S. 1945) modifying a decree
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seller controlled the entire supply of a commodity,2 5 a rejection of this test is
implicit in the conviction of Alcoa, for the court expressly assumes (1) that
Alcoa controlled less than 100 percent of the "virgin" ingot available for
sale in the United States, and (2) that Alcoa did not possess complete market
control, or what might be termed "absolute monopoly power" over price or
production.26 On the other hand, the court does not assert that Section 2
will be violated whenever any degree of monopoly power is present, i.e.,
"whenever the conditions under which goods are sold fall short of those which
constitute perfect competition." Therefore, since the critical degree of
monopoly power must fall somewhere between these extremes, it becomes
necessary both to develop a technique for measuring degrees of monopoly
power, and to determine how much monopoly power must be proved to exist
before a violation of Section 2 is established.
Monopoly power might be measured by the fewness of the producers of a
given commodity, or by the percentage of the supply of a given commodity
controlled by any one seller; and it is the latter criterion upon which the
court in the Alcoa case relies. 28 But such tests are not a complete answer.
A uniform business practice of price leadership may create substantial
monopoly power over price or production even where the number of sellers
is relatively large or the percentage controlled by any one relatively small."
Moreover, in any market situation the result will turn (as it did in the Alcoa
of the lower court awarding an injunction against violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541
(N. D. Ohio 1942). The district court reserved judgment on the dissolution of Hartford,
pending the effect of its decree which it hoped would restore competition to the industry.
The effect of the Supreme Court mandate that the receivership be wound up was, in the
opinion of Mr. Justices Black and Reed who dissented, to foreclose the possibility of dis-
solving Hartford and to "emasculate the decree."
25. See McIssAc AND SMITE, ESSENTIAL ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1941) 84; FETTER,
THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931) 345. See also MUND, MONOPOLY: A HISTORY AND
THEORY (1933).
26. See Witcox, TNEC REP., COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
Monograph 21 (1941) 9.
27. WiLcox, TNEC REP., COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
Monograph 21 (1941) 10. Under such a definition monopoly would be "well-nigh univer-
sal." Ibid.
Early circuit court cases went as far as saying (for the purpose of demonstrating that
the Sherman Act should not be literally applied) that "Every sale and every transportation
of an article which is the subject of interstate commerce evidences a successful attempt to
monopolize that trade or commerce which concerns that sale or transportation." United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177, 191 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1909). See also Whitwell v.
Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454, 462 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903), and discussion of these and
other cases in FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931) 347-50.
28. 148 F. (2d) at 424-5.
29. See Comer, Price Leadership (1940) 7 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 61; HANDLER, supra
note 12, at 40-5.
Clearly the court in the Alcoa case goes too far in saying that "it is doubtful whether
sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not."
148 F. (2d) at 424.
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case") upon the definition of the "commodity" in question. A manufacturer
may be the sole producer of an identifiable commodity (such as a brand-
name cereal) and yet possess no appreciable monopoly power because other
commodities (cereals bearing other brand names) may be substituted by the
consumer with very slight loss in satisfaction. 31 The difficulties of measur-
ing substitutability for purposes of delimiting the market in question suggest
that it will prove more useful to measure monopoly power indirectly by de-
tecting the presence of its results, such as restricted production and non-
competitive prices.3 2 The district court employed one such yardstick, the
size of profits, in reaching the conclusion that Section 2 had not been vio-
lated.33 But while high profits establish conclusively the presence of mo-
nopoly, low profits, as Judge Hand points out, do not necessarily indicate
that monopoly power is absent; "the mere fact that a producer, having
command of the domestic market, has not been able to make more than a
'fair' profit, is no evidence that a 'fair' profit could not have been made at
lower prices." 34 As an alternative it has been suggested that, since the
"essence of monopoly" and of its social cost is the power of the monopolist
to sell a given unit at a price which is greater than the cost of producing that
30. The district court determined the percentage of market control (33%) by balancing
Alcoa's "virgin" ingot production against "secondary" ingot (made from aluminum scrap)
and foreign importations of virgin, excluding the "virgin" ingot which Alcoa fabricated itself.
See 44 F. Supp. at 165; 148 F. (2d) at 424. The circuit court of appeals, while it derived its
figure of over 90% by balancing Alcoa's total "virgin" production against the "virgin"
aluminum ingot imported, 148 F. (2d) at 424-5, suggested the third possibility of balancing
Alcoa's total production "against the sum of imported 'virgin' and 'secondary'" (vwhich
would have given a result around 64%). Id. at 424.
In addition, Judge Hand pointed out that" 'Alcoa' vs free to raise its prices as it choTe
... save as it drew other metals into the market as substitutes," id. at 426; and the district
court apparently gave substantial weight to the fact that "Steel (meaning stainles3 steel),
nickel, tin, zinc, copper and lead . .. , as well as other materials, are commercial competi-
tors of aluminum for many purposes." 44 F. Supp. at 165.
31. See WILcOX, TNEC REP., CoPETmrrro AND MONOPOLY wl Amerac'u I.musm ",
Monograph 21 (1941) 10; Mcls.uic AND S,,srm, EsSENTLL Ecoxomc Pzm;cxrirs (1941)
85, 90-2; CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNorOLISTIC CoPrLTI~roz, (1942) 7.
32. See Lerner, The Concept of M1onopoly and t7e M3feasurement of Monopoly .Power
(1934) 1 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 157, 168.
33. See 44 F. Supp. at 286-304. See also Bain, The Profit Rate as a feasure of M,[a-
noovy Power (1941)55 Q. J. Ecoi. 271; Rothschild, TheDegree of Monopoly(1942)9 Eco!.ou-
ICA (N.s.) 24, 30; Bain, M1easurements of the Degree of 3onopoly: a Note (1943) 10 Econ;ou-
IcA (N.s.) 66; Rothschild, A Further Yote on the Degree of Monopolo (1943) 10 EcooucA
(N.s.) 69.
34. 148 F. (2d) at 427, citing United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed.
964, 1014, 1015 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). See also Lerner, The Concept of 2onopoly anrd the Meas-
urement of lfonopoly Power (1934) 1 REv. OF EcoN. STtrons 157, 168: "... what we want
in the measure of monopoly is not the amount of tribute individuals can obtain for them-
selves from the rest of the community, by being in an advantageous monopolistic poation,
but the divergence of the system from the social optimum that is reached in perfect competi-
tion."
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unit, 35 the degree of monopoly power should be measured in terms of this
difference between price and marginal cost.3" Inasmuch, however, as the
measurement of marginal cost in a manner which will be conclusively per-
suasive on the courts may prove a task beyond the limits of techniques pres-
ently available, 37 it would probably be unwise to place too much reliance on
this criterion. But that it has now become imperative to devise techniques
both for measuring monopoly power and for determining what degree of
monopoly power may exist before Section 2 is violated seems clear.3 s Judge
Hand's commendable although not entirely satisfactory attempt to apply
"economic considerations" is a demonstration that a further rapprochement
between law and economics will be required before this provision of the
Sherman Act can be enforced to the limit of its potentialities.39 The reason-
ing of the Alcoa case clearly makes Section 2 applicable to the vitally impor-
tant class of monopoly problems where the industry consists of a few large
sellers, or a small number of large sellers and a large number of very small
ones, without a more refined definition of its terms; the enforcement of
Section 2 in less obvious cases, however, may be expected to focus contro-
versy on such problems of terminology.
But the Sherman Act is more than a weapon of economic policy. That
there is grave danger to social and political democracy in the concentration
of economic opportunity, management, and power is now generally as-
sumed, 40 and it is the conclusion of the Second Circuit that one of the pur-
35. See id. at 169; WALLACE, MARRET CONTROL IN TnE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY (1937)
314, 358-9.
36. In his The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, supra
note 32, Professor Lerner uses Price-Marginal Costas the index of the degree of monopoly
Price
power.
Fortheoretical criticism of this formula see Bauer,A NoteonMonopoly (1941) 8 ECONOis-
ICA (N.S.) 194. Cf. Rothschild, The Degree of Monopoly (1942) 9 EcONOMICA (N.s.) 24,
38-9.
37. An attempt to develop a statistical technique for applying the index (to the prob-
lem of price flexibility) is made in Dunlop, Price Flexibility and the "Degree of Monopoly"
(1939) 53 Q. J. EcoN. 522. But see Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power
(1941) 55 Q. J. EcoN. 271, 272 (". . . the direct statistical measurement .. .of marginal
cost is in most cases next to impossible . . . ."); Rothschild, The Degree of Monopoly (1942)
9 ECONOeICA (N.s.) 24, 30 (". . . Mr. Dunlop has to fight hard in order to give numerical
values to Mr. Lerner's index and he is only able to do so after having made some bold and
far-reaching simplifying assumptions.").
38. "Without a clear economic conception of monopoly and with no clear distinction
between it and the older confused legal conceptions, the courts are impotent to detect and
prevent the multitude of limited, territorial, as well as national and flagrant operations, of
private monopoly in America." FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931) 350.
39. See Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 34.
40. Of the dangers which inhere in the concentration of economic power, the threat of
totalitarianism and autocratic political control is perhaps the greatest. See FETER, DE-
MOCRACY AND MONOPOLY (1939); final report of the TNEC, SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1941) 24-30; WILcox, TNEC REP., COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN
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poses of the Act was to prevent this concentration regardless of considera-
tions of technological efficiency or of optimum size as measured by economic
criteria. 41 This second interpretation of Section 2, however, is entirely inde-
pendent of the economic implications of the section; and allegations of a
concentration which is excessive for non-economic reasons are clearly not
prerequisites for a finding that a defendant violates the Act because he pos-
sesses an appreciable degree of monopoly power.
In remanding the case to the district court, the circuit court of appeals
remarked that dissolution of Alcoa may be rendered unnecessary 42 by the
manner in which the Surplus Property Board 43 disposes of the Government-
owned ingot-producing capacity built and operated by Alcoa during the
war. But, although in IIarch 1944 these plants accounted for 56 percent of
the aluminum ingot produced in the United States, " their distance from
adequate sources of alumina and of cheap hydroelectric power drives their
operating costs substantially above Alcoa's 's and makes it unlikely that
their sale a can be expected to create conditions of effective price competi-
INDUSTRY, Monograph 21 (1941) 18. See also BLAISDELL, TNEC REP., Eco:;omc Povmrn
AND POLITICAL PRESSURES, Monograph 26 (1941).
41. "... . Congress . .. did not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it
forbad all. Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone.
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small pro-
ducers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the
great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which
we have suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the decisions prove to have
been in fact its purposes." 148 F (2d) at 427.
But see CRUM', CORPORATE SIZE AND EARNING POWER (1939) 7 (protesting against the
identification of monopoly with "mere size of enterprise"). See also ArmLD, TrE BOTTLE-
NECKS OF BUSINESS (1940) 124-6.
42. 148 F. (2d) at 445-8.
43. Section 2(d) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 457, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Oct. 3, 1944), provides: "The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this
Act are to facilitate and regulate the orderly disposal of surplus property so as to discourage
monopolistic practices and to strengthen and preserve the competitive position of small
business concerns in an economy of free enterprise."
44. The report of the "Truman Committee" showed as of March, 1944 "that the annual
production of 'Alcoa's' plants was about 828 million pounds; that the production of plants
owned by the plaintiff which it had leased to 'Alcoa,' was about 1293 million pounds; and
that the production of the Reynolds and Olin plants was together, 202 million pounds."
148 F. (2d) at 445.
45. See Muller, The Aluminum Monopoly and the War (March 1945) 60 POL. Sci Q.
14, 39-43.
46. Not only will prospective purchasers of the Government-owned plants be rebuffed
by higher operating costs than Alcoa, but also by the present glutted condition of the alumi-
num market. Discussing the absence of "takers" for the Government plants, Tiwe 2aga-
zine reported: "As yet, there have been no takers. Reason: the chances of getting any new
competitors in the aluminum business now are almost nonexistent. The highest alltime
prewar aluminum consumption in the U. S. was under 400 million pounds. Alcoa alone can
produce more than twice that amount-S60 million pounds. Reynolds Metals can add
another 160 million. Already on hand is a war-built stockpile of a billion pounds. Thus
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tion. Indeed, it seems doubtful that purchasers of these plants would find it
profitable to continue them in operation except under a noncompetitive
price ceiling which Alcoa's control of 35 percent of the industry's wartime
capacity would doubtless permit it to maintain. It seems clear, therefore,
that effect can be given to the circuit court of appeals' decision only by the
dissolution of Alcoa 41 into a series of independent and competing corpora-
tions, perhaps twenty in number.48
The Alcoa decision is a turning point in the history of the Sherman Act.
By eliminating questions of conspiracy and concert of action from Sherman
Act trials, it should permit a drastic reduction in the time, effort and expense
consumed by such proceedings. By confining the antitrust trial to problems
of economic organization, the Act is made an infinitely more useful and prac-
tical instrument of economic and social policy. A series of relatively brief,
industry-wide proceedings under Section 2 should lead to substantial progress
towards achieving the purposes of the statute.
C
ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS IN EVIDENCE:
FEDERAL SHOP BOOK STATUTE::
THE federal shop book statute renders admissible in evidence "in any
court of the United States" all entries made "in the regular course of busi-
ness" and contemporaneously with the recorded "act, transaction, occur-
RFC must find operators willing to take a long chance, or (more likely) shut down the
plants." Time, Sept. 17, 1945, p. 90, col. 2.
47. Attorney General Tom C. Clark has recommended the atomization of Alcoa in his
recent report to Congress on the aluminum industry. In the words of Mr. Clark, "A vague
expression by Government of its preference for competition is not enough to establish that
condition in the aluminum industry .... The pattern of industry must be recast. Because
habits and customs deeply rooted for many decades must be displaced by entirely new rela-
tionships. Nothing less can infuse this industry effectively with competition." N. Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1945, p. 15, col. 3.
The restoration of competitive conditions in the domestic aluminum industry would
also be facilitated by a reduction of the high tariff that has for years protected Alcoa against
competition from foreign importations of "virgin" aluminum ingot. See WALLACE, MARICT
CONTROL IN THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY (1937) 238-44.
48. "It will be necessary to revise notions commonly accepted (especially by courts)
as to the maximum size of firm compatible with effective competition. The general rule and
ultimate objective should be that of fixing in each industry a maximum size of firm such
that the results of perfect competition would be approximated even if all firms attained the
maximum size. One may suggest, tentatively, that in major industries no ownership unit
should produce or control more than 5 percent of the total output." SIMONS, A POSITIVE
PROGRAM FOR LAISSEz FAIRE (1934) 38, n. 5.
* New York Life Insurance Company v. Taylor, 147 F, (2d) 297 (App. D. C. 1945).
[Vol, 54
NOTES
rence, or event." I One of the principal purposes of the federal statute was
to eliminate the necessity of calling as witnesses persons who made entries
in records submitted as evidence.2 But it is problematical whether the
statute in order to effectuate this purpose, substituted for the more stringent
common law requirements of reliability a the practical condition that an
institution have relied upon the records in the conduct of its daily affairs.4
1. 49 STAT. 1561 (1936), 28 U.S. C. § 695 (1940).
"In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of
Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or other-
wise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or
event, shall be admissible as evidence of said act, transaction, occurrence, or
event, if it shall appear that it was made in the regular course of any business, and
that it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record
at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable
time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record,
including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to
affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term 'business'
shall include business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind."
Prior to the enactment of this statute hospital records as well as records of other insti-
tutions, were admissible only under the "business-entries" exception to the hearsay rule.
"In some cases the record appears to have been admitted on the theory that it was a record
kept in the regular course of business." Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 373, 379. See, e.g., Clayton
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P. (2d) 819 (1938); Schmidt v. Riemen-
schneider, 196 Minn. 612, 265 N. IM 816 (1936); Ribas v. Revere Rubber Co., 37 R. I. 1S9,
91 Adt. 58 (1914). But cf. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident A-s'n v. Bell, 49 Ga. App. 640,
176 S. E. 124 (1934).
2. The steady judicial trend had been to broaden the definition of "unavaiability"
in business-entries cases. This limitation vas familiar in the earlier English cases. Price v.
Earl of Torrington, 1 Salk. 285, 91 Eng. Rep. R. 252 (I. B. 1703). It has also been held to
include "mere inability by reasonable effort to find the man or men who could speak with
personal knowledge." The Spica, 289 Fed. 436, 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). See alzo Note
(1944) 17 So. CALIF. L. REv. 409. From this point it is an easy step to the argument that
members of a hospital staff are, practically, "unavailable" since "the calling of all the in-
dividual attendant physicians and nurses who have cooperated to make the record even of a
single patient would be a serious interference with convenience of hospital managemnt."
6 WXIGoRE, EviDEXcE (3d ed. 1940) § 1707. See Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1214. The
American Law Institute's Committee on Evidence, in determining the admissibility of
hearsay declarations would accept "as a ground of unavailability of the declarant any in-
ability to secure his testimony not due to the fault or procurement of the proponent of the
evidence." A. L. I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 503, p. 232. According to this
rule the persons who made the entries excluded in the Taylor case, page 873 ifra, would
probably be held "unavailable."
3. For example, hospital records must be verified in court. Lindquist v. Friedelzon,
232 App. Div. 857, 248 N. Y. Supp. 775 (3d Dep't 1931). Ignorance of formal requirements
for authentication has led to the rejection of such records. St. Louis v. Boston & Maine
R. R., 83 N. H. 538, 145 Adt. 263 (1929); Bolden -. State, 140 Tenn. 118, 203 S. IV. 755
(1918); Bankers' Reserve Life Co. v. Harper, 188 Ark. S1, 64 S. NV. (2d) 327 (1933); Com-
monwealth v. Del Giorno, 303 Pa. 509, 154 At. 786 (1931); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Mapp, 38 Ga. App. 30, 142 S. E. 564 (1928) (failure to identify entrant); and cases citcd in
Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 378,386-93.
4. See, e.g., 5 WIGORE, EvIDEncE (3d ed. 1940) § 1530a: "[The Act was] intended to
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The recent case of New York Life Insurance Company v. Taylor I presents
this issue.
The Taylor case was an action on a life insurance policy which provided
for double indemnity for accidental death. Insured, a patient in a federal
veterans' hospital, had been found dead at the foot of a stair-well. On appeal
from a verdict for the widow, it was alleged that hospital records relevant
to the issue of suicide had been improperly excluded.' The records consisted
of the patient's statement of his history upon entering the hospital, the
diagnosis of his condition at that time, and records of subsequent treatment;
in addition, they contained reports of consultations in which decedent had
explained his taking of large doses of codein and aspirin in terms indicating
suicidal thoughts, and psychiatric reports, including one diagnosing his
condition as "psychoneurosis, hypochondriasis." There were two hearings
.on the question of admissibility.' At the first trial, Justice Arnold sustained
the exclusion of the records, conceding that while "a literal reading of the...
statute" required their admission, 8 the Supreme Court decision in Palmer v.
Hoffman' had narrowed the statute's applicability to routine entries of
put an end to logical narrowness in the use of the [business-entries] principle, and to bring
the rule of Evidence nearer to the standards accepted in responsible action outside of tile
Courts."
5. 147 F. (2d) 297 (App. D. C. 1945).
6. It appears that the records were excluded by the trial court, not on the ground that
they were hearsay, but on the theory that since insurance "companies .. .amply protect
themselves .. . the terms of the policy should be strictly construed and . . . therefore,
the language of the policy . . . should not be extended to cover hospital records. .. .
Quoted in Brief for Appellant on Rehearing, pp. 97-8.
7. The case was first argued on March 14, 1944 and was decided on May 8, 1944. The
decision upon rehearing was delivered on Jan. 10, 1945.
8. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297, 300 (App. D. C. 1945): "A
literal reading of the above statute would make the records in this case admissible on the
theory that the business of operating a hospital requires records of the histories of patients,
reports of unusual conduct and also diagnoses by physicians."
9. 318 U. S. 109 (1943). This was a tort action for injuries to the plaintiff and the
death of his wife due to a grade-crossing accident. The trial court excluded a transcript of a
statement signed by the engineer involved in the accident, rejecting an offer of proof by the
defendant railroad trustees that the statement was made "in the regular course of business
and that it was the regular course of such business to make such statement." On appeal to
the circuit court of apl eals, the trial court's judgment for plaintiff was sustained. Hoffman
v. Palmer, 129 F. (2d) 976, 979 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). Judge Frank's opinion argued that the
engineer's statement was untrustworthy because "loaded .. .with motives to misrepresent
the facts." Id. at 983. See, however, Judge Clark's dissent at pp. 998-1002 and the critical
analysis of the majority holding by Professor Maguire in Note (1942) 56 HARV. L. Rtv. 458,
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision on the ground that the
engineer's report was not made in the "regular course of business" since having accidents and
preparing statements for litigation is not part of a railroad's business. Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U. S. 109 (1943), noted in (1944) 17 So. CALIF. L. REV. 165. Compare RICUARDSON,
EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1944) 228: "This decision is sound in principle. . . ." Compare Sullivan
v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 50, 200 N. W. 922, 924 (1924) (a common law
case holding admissible a motorman's report of an emergency stop. The report had been
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daily operations on the reliability of which there was "an internal check." 10
In again excluding the records on rehearing"1 , Justice Arnold shifted his doc-
trinal basis from judicial precedent to statutory mandate. A loosely-arguep
opinion yields the following syllogism: Major premise: The federal shop book
statute did not change the common law requirement that records be free of
"opinion or conjecture." Minor premise: The records in question involve
opinion. Conclusion: The records are not admissible under the statute.
Justice Arnold's initial assumption was that the "established principles of
the shop book exception to the hearsay rule" were not changed by the fed-
eral statute. 12 At common law, this exception was limited to account-books
of litigants; its strict requirements were necessitated by the great risk of
misrepresentation in the keeping of such records. But the federal statute
renders admissible any record kept in the "regular course of business," in-
made before declarant knew of plaintiff's claim, not, as in the Palmer case, in contemplation
of litigation).
10. "But the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Hoffman, has, we believe, limited the ad-
mission of records under the Federal Shop Book Rule statute to those which are trust-
worthy because they represent routine reflections of day-to-day operations." 147 F. (2d)
at300.
The first Taylor opinion is noted in (1944) 18 So. CA.iF. L. REv. 60.
The decision was also sharply critized by Judge Frank, speaking for the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Buckminster's Estate v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 147 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A.
2d, 1944), in which an opinion of the Tax Court admitting hospital records of diagnoei was
upheld. Judge Frank distinguished the records involved in the Taylor case from thoez in
the Palmer case, supra note 17, in that the former were tinged with no "such motive to mis-
present as was present in the Palmer case." Id. at 334. But even had the Palmer case bUan
directly in point, one may question the soundness of Justice Arnold's assertion that he was
bound by a Supreme Court gloss which altered the "literal" meaning of the statute. It has
been contended, too, that, if the Supreme Court's rule that "'regular course of business'
must find its meaning in the inherent nature of the business in question and in the methods
systematically employed for the conduct of the business as a business" [Palmer v. Hoffman,
318 U. S. 109, 115 (1943) ] be adopted, Justice Arnold would have been compelled to admit
the hospital records, on the ground that a hospital's essential business is the care of the cick.
Note (1944) 18 So. CALIr. L. Rnv. 60. 61.
11. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 301 (App. D.C. 1945).
12. Id. at 302. The name "Federal Shop Book Statute" adopted by Justice Arnold for
§ 695 is misleading. A number of doctrines emerged at common law pertaining to the admis-
sion of business entries in evidence. The two which applied to the use of such entries as
primary evidence of the facts recorded were the shop book rule and the general entries rule.
The history of the two doctrines has been so intertwined that "the exacting requirements for
the admission of parties' books, imposed because of the parties' interest, have been carried
over, without reason, to the business entries rule." Comment (1937) 32 ILL. L. Rnv. 334,
337. The distinctions between the two doctrines seem to have been based on the nature of
the entries involved and the probability of trustworthiness. The shop-bool: rule "was in-
tended for cases of small traders who kept no clerks ..... " Smith v. Rentz, 131 N. Y.
169, 176, 30 N. E. 54, 56 (1892). It was designed to facilitate proof of claims against de-
linquent customers. MORGAN e al., Tn LAW OF EVIDENCE: SO!E PROFOS.u.S FOn ITS
REoPs (1927) 51. Account-books of litigants were admitted in evidence by English courts
from a very early date. THA YER, CASES ON EVMDENCE (Ist ed. 1892) 471, n. 1, 505. 503 Be-
cause of the inevitable abuses of this practice, the admissibility of such records was circum-
scribed by a statute of 1609. 7 JAs. I, c. 12, 1 ENG. STAT. Rrv. 564 (2d rev. ed. 1835). Since
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cluding records of third parties,13 which previously were admitted only
under the "business entries" rule.
It would seem, then, that the phrase "regular course of business" incor-
porated the business-entries, rather than the shop-book exception to the
hearsay rule. Indeed, the phraseology of the statute argues an intent to
adopt an even more liberal standard of admissibility than the business-
entries rule affords. 14 Thus, the requirement that the record have been
made "at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a
reasonable time thereafter" is the only traditional restriction explicit in the
Act.'5 The inclusion of this one restriction on admissibility would seem,
judicial distrust of account-books, however, was based on their self-serving nature, entries
against the interest of the makers began to be admitted, and this was the origin of the busi-
ness entries rule. Note (1942) 56 HARv. L. REv. 458, 463 and cases cited in notes 32-36,
The emergence of the broader business-entries doctrine and its development in the United
States is well summarized in MORGAN el al., supra, at 53, and is spelled out at length in 5
WIGIJORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1518. See also RicuARDsON, EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1944)
c. 12.
13. See note 1 supra.
14. § 695 differs from the Model Act proposed by the Commonwealth Fund Com-
mittee in only one respect. The Committee's draft reads in part: ". . . any writing ..
made as a memorandum or record of any act . . .shall be admissible in evidence in proof
of said act... ." MORGAN el al., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SO'ME PROFOSALS FOR ITS RE,-
FoRm (1927) 63. In the statute this becomes: ". . . any writing . . .made as a memoran-
dum or record of any act . . .shall be admissible as evidence of said act. .. ."
15. This clause merely retates the established judicial rule that "The entry should have
been made at or near the time of the transaction recorded. . . ." 5 NVIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) § 1526 and cases cited in n. 1. See 4 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE (1913) § 2890.
The necessity of such a requirement as a check on the entrant's memory is apparent. See
THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908) 302. The statute should not be interpreted as limiting the
permissible time-lapse between the making of a memorandum by nurse or physician and its
transcription to a permanent record. Clearly the reliability of an entry is not affected by any
period after the first recordation of an act or event. Thus, "if a memorandum was made
within a reasonable time, it should be immaterial that the entry offered was not recorded
until some later time." Note (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 1044, 1053. See Lund v, Olson, 182
Minn. 204, 234 N. W. 310 (1931); Grossman v. Delaware Elect. Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155
Atl. 806 (1929). Indeed, the statute goes so far as to provide that "all other circumstances
of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant
or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility." See
note 1 supra. This proviso was intended to counteract the rule against "double hearsay"
which rendered entries "inadmissible if the party making them had at the time no personal
knowledge in respect to them." MCKELvEY, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1932) § 206, and cases cited.
Despite some conflict in the earlier cases [see Note (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 1044, 1053,
n. 56], it had become "well established that [hospital] records are not admissible to prove
those things that are patently hearsay, such as statements told to the maker of the record
by the patient. . . ." Comment (1939) 38 MicE. L. REv. 219, 226. Helminsky v. Ford
Motor Co.,'10 N. J. Misc. 1042, 162 Atl. 189 (1932) (patient's recorded statement as to
cause of injury "pure hearsay"); Hill v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co,, 11 Tenn.
App. 33 (1929); Grossman v. Delaware Electric Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155 Atl. 806 (1929);
Delaney v. Framingham Gas Fuel & Power Co., 202 Mass. 359,88 N. E. 773 (1909); Shaugh-
nessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 86 N. E. 256 (1908). Contra: Fay v. Harlan, 128 Mass. 244, 35
Am. Rep. 372 (1880) (admitting patient's account of his symptoms on examination). And
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under familiar rules of construction, to reflect a legislative intent to discard
all restrictions not enumerated-- The indications are that the specific phrase
"regular course of business" was used in a conventional and not in the
technical sense adopted by Justice Arnold. According to his exegesis, a
record is admissible only if it is "an automatic reflection of observations,"
the reliability of which "comes from two sources: (1) an efficient clerical
system, and (2) the fact that they are the kind of observations on which
competent men would not differ." 1? Yet, according to the more conven-
cf. Ribas v. Revere Rubber Co., 37 R. I. 189, 91 At. 58 (1914). It is true, however, that
in some states which have adopted statutes similar to § 695 narrative statements such as
those involved in the ThIor case have been ecluded. The rule in New. York: has been par-
ticularly rigid in spite of one commentator's conclusion that "the Statute [N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 374-A, added by Laws 1928, c. 532] was intended to ... dispense with the per-onal
knowledge . . . previously required for admissibility." Note (1930) 39 YALu L. J. 1214.
See Geroeami v. Fancy Fruit & Produce Corp., 249 App. Div. 221, 291 N. Y. Supp. 837
(1st Dep't 1936) (admission of statement by physician based on bystander's testimony that
patient had been intoxicated at time of accident held reversible error); Wolf v. Kaufman,
227 App. Div. 281, 237 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1st Dep't 1929) (admission of hospital record con-
taining report of policeman based on information obtained from others held error). Other
courts have been similarly strict in their construction of state Model Acts: Sadjal: v.Parzer-
Wolverine Co., 281 Mich. 84, 274 N. W. 719 (1937) (excluding notation that patient said
he had sustained injury by failing from a ladder on ground that "what decedent told the
hospital authorities did not refer to any act, transaction, occurrence or event in the ho-pital
treatment." Id. at 87, 274 N. N. at 720); Beverly Beach Club v. Marron, 172 Md. 471,
192 Atl. 278 (1937) (entry that patient had cut his foot on broken glass held inadmiEsible).
But an incorrect application of a state statute should not afford grounds for similar mis-
application of § 695: the intent that all factors other than time of recording should merely
affect weight and not the admissibility of evidence should certainly be given effect.
16. See 2 SUTHERLAD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943) §§ 4703-4704.
17. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297, 303 (App. D. C. 1945). Thus,
according to Justice Arnold, the phrase "any ,riting" as used in the statute is not equivalent
to "all writings." (See also Appellee's Brief on Rehearing, p. 12: ". . . nor was it con-
templated that it would open the door to the introduction of any records kept in the cour e
of a business.") To be admissible, a record must have been kept "in the regular cour~e of
business," and this "obviously excludes those which depend on opinion or conjecture."
Ibid. "The practice of using common law definitions to explain statutory terms is commonly
recognized." Note (1943) 31 GEo. L. J. 338, 339. But the reading of an ancient meaning
into "regular course of business" has been characterized by Judge Clark as "more shrewd
and labored than frank or even helpful in defining the projected rule . . . this is a new
technique of judicial legislation; it will permit extensive incorporation of almost any ancient
rule into new reform legislation merely by saying that certain ordinary and well-Imown
expressions include the common law in themselves." Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F. (2d) 976,
1001 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
Nevertheless, Justice Arnold would require an "internal checJ: on . . reliability"
different from any test used by the hospital in which the records were kept. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, supra, at 303. This insistence upon a positive guaranty of reliability was
challenged by Justice Edgerton in a vigorous dissenting opinion. Id at 309. Compare
MIoRGAN et at., Tnn LAw oF EVIDENCE: SO!_rE PROFOSALS rOR ITS REmorat (1927) 38: "If
the declaration appears to have been made in good faith . . . it has been considered suffi-
ciently trustworthy to be submitted to the jury." Professor Wigmore regards "the circum-
stantial probability of trustworthiness" as a basic reason for admitting business records
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tional use of the phrase, the test of the reliability of records, and therefore
of their admissibility, is their previous acceptance and use by the institution
as a guide in daily operations. The committee which framed the model act
in 1927 based its recommendations on a ten-year survey of mercantile prac-
tice in the course of which they found the common-law tests of admissibility
ill-adapted to current business practices."8 In order to forestall a judicial
narrowing of the phrase "regular course of business" the statute provided
that no circumstances other than unreasonable delay should affect admissi-
bility. 9 Judicial support in this attempt to adopt a more practical standard
of admissibility was indicated by the dictum in the Palmer case that" 'regu-
lar course of business' must find its meaning in the inherent nature of the
business in question and in the methods systematically employed for the
conduct of the business as a business." 20
In accordance with this view courts in general have not subjected medical
diagnoses to a test of competence different from that applied to more routine
entries.21 Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that it is "no longer open to
[5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1422], but deplores the failure of the courts "to give
full effect to the spirit of the statutes" lid. at § 1530a] and urges a liberal rule of admissibility
for hospital records since they are "made and relied upon in the affairs of life and death,"
6 WIGMo RE, supra, at § 1707.
The reliability of hospital records would seem to be attested, too, by the patient's
-interest in correct diagnosis, the professional concern of the entrant nurses and physicians
with accuracy, the systematic nature of the entries, and the absence of any litigious interest
in falsification. See Kellogg v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 60 Ohio App. 22, 19 N. E.
(2d) 511 (1938). Globe Indemnity Co. of New York v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 446-7, 137
A. 43, 46 (1927). Accord: Schmidt v. Reimenschneider, 196 Minn. 612, 265 N. W. 816
(1936); Opdyke v. Halbach, 123 N. J. L. 123, 7 A. (2d) 635 (1939); Pickering v. Peskind, 43
Ohio App. 401, 183 N. E. 301 (1930). ,
18. "The adjudicated cases alone, without any independent investigation into current
systems of accounting, reveal the need of inducing the courts to give evidential credit to the
books upon which the mercantile and industrial world relies in the conduct of business,."
MORGAN, et al., op. cit. supra note 17, at 51. In summarizing its investigation the Com-
mittee found that, while the common law furnished "a method by which most business
accounts can be proved," the cost was "exorbitant." Id. at 57. Many of the firms surveyed
reported that they could not both continue their business operations and meet the common
law requirements in preparing records!
19. See note 14 supra.
20. Justice Douglas in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 (1943).
21. Norwood v. Great American Indemnity Co., 146 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944)
(autopsy report admitted in action on double indemnity clause of life insurance policy);
Buckminster's Estate v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 147 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) (diagnosis
of cerebral hemorrhage admitted); Becker v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 7th,
1944) (entry of "psychoneurosis, hysteria" admitted); Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
138 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) (record of patient's stated age admitted); Prudential Ins,
Co. of America v. Saxe, 134 F. (2d) 16 (App. D. C. 1943); Reed v. Order of United Com-
mercial Travelers of America, 123 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (entry of "well under the
influence of alcohol" admitted in suit on fraternal benefit insurance certificate); Ulm v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. 117 F. (2d) 222 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (clinical records includ-
ing patient's narrative of "subjective symptoms" and physician's statement that "he does
not appear acutely ill" admitted); Meaney v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 2d,
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question in this court" that "a hospital record of the attending doctor's
diagnosis of a patient's condition is competent evidence." 2 Nor is there
precedent to support treating psychiatric diagnoses differently from any
other medical diagnoses: courts have never before drawn Justice Arnold's
distinction between diagnoses based on observation and those based on
"opinion and conjecture." 2 Four years before the statute, observations by
government medical officers of psychoneurotic symptoms were admitted by
the predecessor of the court which rejected them in the Taylor case; 21 and
in a recent suit on war-risk insurance, the Seventh Circuit admitted a
diagnosis of "psychoneurosis, hysteria." 2 Even in New York-a state
1940) (in action on war-risk insurance, exclusion of insured's "history of the case" as told to
physician held reversible error); Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940) (coroner's certificate embodying opinion as to cause of death admitted). Before the
passage of the act of 1936, diagnostic entries were accepted on a variety of doctrinal grounds:
United States v. Balance, 59 F. (2d) 1040, 1042 (App. D. C. 1932) (abstracts of obzarvations
by government medical officers admitted in war-risk insurance case on ground that reparts
were official, "made in the performance of [a] duty, and were presumably correct");
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bullock, 59 F. (2d) 747 (S. D. Fla. 1932) (in suit to cancel im-ur-
ance policy, medical history of insured admitted in so far as it related to diagnozii and
treatment); Adler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. (2d) 827, (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (in suit
to cancel life insurance policy, physician's office records of examination and treatment ad-
mitted as "the best and most available evidence" and because "there is as much reason for
verity in such records as in books of account"). But cf. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Grubaugh,
128 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) (in tort action for assault, statement in hospital report
that plaintiff was fit for work held properly excluded); United States v. Chandler, 87 F.
(2d) 356 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) (physicians' reports not properly identified as original records
excluded).
22. Reed v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 123 F. (2d) 252, 253
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cited infra note 36.
23. ". . . the attempted distinction between a diagnosis and an 'observation' based
on the patient's appearance is without substance." It was held that a diagnosis of an alco-
holic state is "as much a diagnosis of his existing condition as would a statement that the
patient appears to have a fractured skull." Id. at 253. Justice Arnold cites the Rosa! casz
as illustrating a type of observation on which "competent physicians would not differ,"
and hence admissible. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) at 303.
The only exception found in the Federal Reporter is Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Grubaugh,
128 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), cited infra note 36. judge Hutcheson stated that the
federal statute "merely accredits the facts that [hospital records] contain, it dofs not purport
to make opinions admissible as evidence." Id. at 390. The entry excluded was a statement
in a hospital report that the patient vas fit for work-an opinion hardly comparable with
the technical diagnoses involved in the Taylor case.
There has been a greater diversity of treatment accorded diagnostic entries in state
courts. The subject has been eitensively covered elsewhere. See Hale, Hospital Rcrcrds as
Evidence (1941) 14 So. CALuf. L. REv. 99; Comment (1939) 38 MAlca. L. Rnv. 219, and
cases cited at 226, nn. 34, 36; Notes (1931) 73 A. L. R. 378 (1931), 120 A. L. R. 1124 (1939).
24. United States v. Balance, 59 F. (2d) 1040 (App. D. C. 1932), cited supra note 21.
25. Becker v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944), cited infra note 36.
Justice Arnold seeks to distinguish this case on the ground that the patient's treatment for
psychoneurosis was "rele-ant to prove some issue in the case other than the truth of the
diagnosis. ... ." It would seem to be clear that the fact of the treatment in the Taylor
case was likewise primarily relevant, not to the "truth of the diagnozis," but to the iszue of
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which has clung most tenaciously to a strict construction of its model stat-
ute n-the Court of Appeals has admitted dia noses of manic depressive
insanity in language which augurs the broadest rule of admissibility for the
futureYs7
To label psychiatric diagnosis as "conjecture" manifests a hoary judicial
skepticism about mind-healing and an inadequate acquaintance with the
realities of modern medicine. 2s The assertion that there are "infinite diag-
nostic possibilities" as to a neurotic state overlooks the fact that "psy-
choneurosis," "neurosis," "conversion type" are abbreviations for sets of
symptoms which are relatively standardized in medical literature and in-
creasingly relied upon in practice.2 Further, even if "competent men
would differ" on psychiatric diagnosis, disagreement is as commonplace
among practitioners of internal medicine; and records of such diagnoses are
freely admitted as evidence.30 The flat assertion that there is "no magic in
the word diagnosis" can hardly justify exorcizing psychiatric diagnoses by
the intonation of the magic word "conjecture." 31
The rejection of "opinion"-colored records in the Taylor case, however,
was undoubtedly well-intentioned. Justice Arnold clearly believes that the
right of cross-examination should be impaired in no way; 12 in addition he as
surely feels that juries must be protected against the admission of evidence
suicide. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297, 305, n. 11 (App. D. C. 1945)
26. See Note (1941) 11 BROOKLYN L. REv. 78 for a study of the contrasting federal
and New York interpretations of similar evidence statutes. See cases cited in Ulm v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 492, 495 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Cottrell v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 260 App. Div. 986, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 335 (4th Dep't 1940) (". . . The
rule seems to be well established in this State that [diagnostic] notations are not made ad-
missible in evidence by § 374-A of the Civil Practice Act"); Matter of O'Grady, 254 App,
Div. 691, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 778, 779 (2d Dep't 1938) ("the record of the opinions of doctors
with reference to the disorder of the patient are not admissible").
27. "We find no difference in a recorded diagnosis of a physical condition and of a
mental condition." People v. Kohlmeyer, 284 N. Y. 366, 370,31 N. E. (2d) 490,492 (1941);
"It is always competent for physicians to state their scientific opinions . . . founded upon
the facts disclosed in the evidence." Id. at 369. Accord: Meiselman v. Crown Heights
Hospital, 285 N. Y. 389, 34 N. E. (2d) 367 (1941).
28. See also, Mickelson v. Fischer, 81 Wash. 423, 429, 142 P. 1160, 1163 (1914) (".
An allowance of damages in the cases of traumatic neurasthenia touches the border of specu-
lation at best. . . ."); McQuade v. The Golden Rule, 105 Minn. 326, 117 N. W. 484 (1908).
29. See HALL (ed.), ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYcHIATRY (1944); LEVINE,
PSYCHOTHERAPY IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (1942); STEcCKER AND EBAUGH, PRACTICAL CLINI-
CAL PSYCHIATRY FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS (4th ed. 1935) passim.
30. See note 21 supra.
31. For an encouraging indication that such records, if admitted by trial judges, might
receive favorable reception in appellate courts, see opinion of Minton, J. in Becker v. United
States, 145 F. (2d) 171, 172 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944): "In reviewing a case to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, we do not weigh the evidence. All
conflicts are resolved in favor of the verdict."
32. ". . . there can be no question that the fundamental reason for excluding hearsay
is lack of opportunity for adequate cross-examination." Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Iearsay
(1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1138.
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which would be unduly prejudicial.33 Both these convictions disclose the
practicing lawyer's attitude that the competence of evidence should depend
not so much on its logical relevance to an issue as on its practical effect in
the atmosphere of courtroom contest. 34 The arguihent that opposing coun-
sel needs the opportunity to impeach records of psychiatric diagnoses on
cross-examination is amply rebutted, however, by the dissenting opinion's
observation that this need does not operate to exclude more routine entries,
also subject to errors which might be disclosed upon cross-examination.5
Moreover, the statute itself limits cross-examination by eliminating the
requirement of the recorder's presence in court; 5 it recognizes that whatever
advantage might derive from the possibility of discrediting psychiatric
diagnosis under cross-examination is surely outweighed by the social cost of
33. "In the early days of English law ... the jury ... were supposed to be in-
competent to exercise any discrimination in weighing the testimony of witnes-ses." Pel:,
The Rigidity of 17e Rule Against Hearsay (1912) 21 YA. L. J. 25S, 264. Morgan, while
questioning the conventional theory that the hearsay rule emerged from a distrust of juries,
concedes that "the courts have been consciously influenced by the fact that the tribunal
to which the evidence is addressed is the jury." Morgan, T:e Jury ard the Exdusionary
Rules of Evidence (1937) 4 U. oF Cmr. L. REV. 247, 255. For a recent expression of concern
lest juries "overvalue" written records see Morgan and Maguire, Looking Bac%.ard and
Forward at Evidence (1937) 50 H.mv. L. REv. 909, 919.
34. This point of view was explicitly stated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F. (2d) 76, 80 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944): ". . . the competence of evidence in
the end depends upon whether it is likely, all things considered, to advance the cearch for
truth; and that does not inevitably follow from the fact that it is rationally relevant....
the question is always whether what it will contribute rationally to a solution is more than
matched by its possibilities of confusion and surprise, by the length of time and the expense
it will involve, and by the chance that it will divert the jury from the facts which should
control their verdict." The judicial fear that juries will be confused by the dead weight
or undue attractiveness of evidence is discussed in Strahom, Fxlra-Legal Zfaterials and the
Law of Evidence (1934) 29 ILL. L. REv. 300, 326.
In ascribing a mechanical reaction to the jury, Justice Arnold voices the practising
lawyer's mistrust of the juryman's capacity to evaluate evidence: "The drastic impairment
of the right of cross-examination resulting from the admission of this type of unsorn
observation and opinion evidence will be recognized by anyone familiar with the psychology
of a jury trial." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297, 305 (App. D. C. 1945).
35. Edgerton, J., dissenting in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297, 309
(App. D. C. 1945), stated, ". . . the argument that records of psychiatric diagnosis chould
therefore be excluded from the operation of the Rule proves too much. For records of the
simplest observations of the most objective facts which are conceded to be admiFzible
under the Rule are also subject to errors which cross-examination, if it were available,
might expose." Experience with the startling diversity in the accounts of different vitnezZes
to a given event lends point to Justice Edgerton's objection. It would seem, then, that
".. . the occasional errors.and omissions, occurring in the routine work of a large [hozpitall
staff, are no more an obstacle to the general trustworthiness of such records than are the
errors of witnesses on the stand." 6 WVIG-MORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940).§ 1707.
36. See supra notes I and 2. "The modem statutes definitely have dispensed with the
calling of the percipient witnesses as a condition precedent to the admiscibility of regular
entries." Note (1944) 18 So. CAmip. L. REv. 60, 63. Compare the British Evidence Act
of 1938, which authorizes rules of court allowing orders directing that facts may ba proved
by affidavit "with or without the attendance of the deponent for cross-examination, not-
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calling away from their hospital duties doctors and nurses who contributed
to the records."
In any event, under other principles of the law of evidence the records
would be admissible either to refresh the witness's memory of the events re-
corded 38 or as past recollection recorded. 9 Since it seems unlikely that a
recording doctor would be better informed or more impartial on the stand
than he had been at the time of entering the diagnosis, 40 the entries would
probably again become the main reliance for the information which they
contain. To exclude the records of the Taylor case as evidence relevant to
the proof of suicide and to admit them under the above principles seems
unrealistic-even from the point of view of courtroom contest.
The chief reason for the rule of exclusion adopted in the principal case was
probably the court's fear that the trial jury would have been unduly prej-
udiced by the hospital records. 41 This concern is a relic of the ancient
withstanding that a party desires his attendance for cross-examination and that he can be
produced for that purpose." 1 & 2 GEO. 6, c. 28, § 5.
37. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1707, quoted supra note 2.
38. See RIciARDsON, EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1944) §§ 544, 545. The records would not
be admissible under these principles to prove the truth of any statement made by the pa-
tient, but only as an aid in establishing that the particular statements recorded were made.
39. Id. at §§ 544, 546. It has been suggested that cross-examination of the maker of a
routine entry is unimportant because his testimony would only be directed to the identifica-
tion of the written entry-"recorded memory." Note (1944) 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 60, 63.
The same reasoning may be as reasonably applied to diagnostic records, for "amidst the
day-to-day details of scores of hospital cases, the physicians and nurses can ordinarily
recall from actual memory few or none of the specific data entered; . . . hence, to call
them to the stand would ordinarily add little or nothing to the information furnished by
the record alone." 6 WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra note 35.
Since Walter Reed is a government hospital, the records in this case would also be
admissible under the so-called official entries exception to the hearsay rule. The two formal
requisites-that the records have been kept under a requirement of law and that they have
been based on personal knowledge-seem adequately met by the Taylor case reports. See
Hale, Hospital Records as Evidence (1941) 14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 99, 104; Note (1939) 27
C&IF. L. REv. 466, 467; Note (1929) 14 IowA L. REV. 326, 329.
40. "We fail to see why the recorded conclusions of the hospital physicians on scientific
matters should be deemed objectionable on any ground when they would not be objection-
able were the physician whose diagnosis is contained in the record called personally to the
witness stand." People v. Kohlmeyer, 284 N. Y. 366, 369-70, 31 N. E. (2d) 490, 492 (1940),
It may be argued that errors of memory on the witness stand are no less likely than
recorded mistakes. See note 35 supra. Since the likelihood of error is clearly no reason for
disqualifying a witness, it should not be a ground for disallowing a written entry. More-
over, a physician in a government hospital would seem to have no incentive deliberately
to falsify a diagnostic entry or to indulge in random conjectures. On the other hand, "abuses
[on the witness stand] have developed since experts have beconie witnesses for the parties"
as attested by many "shocking exhibitions . . . in personal injury actions." Morgan, Fore-
word in A. L. I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) 34. The instances which Judge Arnold
cites of disagreement among psychiatrists involve "psychiatric witnesses" and not hospi-
tal psychiatrists performing hospital duties.
41. See note 33 supra. It would seem that all evidence is prejudicial, since its very
purpose is to persuade. The logic of Justice Arnold's position is that the "diagnostic im-
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common-law distrust of the capacity of jurymen to appraise testimony,
which was reflected in the hearsay rule, and today takes the form of pro-
tecting the jury from evidence which is too technical for it to evaluate. But
it is not at all clear that the trial jury in the Taylor case would have been
influenced by the records to deprive the plaintiff widow of her mite, for the
diagnosis explicity stated "no suicidal ideas." Nor would the type of psy-
choneurosis attributed to the patient-according to medical opinion-usu-
ally indicate suicide.42 Thus, while relevant to the issue, the records did not
necessarily establish suicidal tendencies. It would seem, therefore, that the
records should have been admitted for their relevancy to the issue of suicide,
and the question of their weight left to the jury; in no case should the proba-
tive value of evidence affect the issue of its competency, lest the judicial
ideal of fullest knowledge be sacrificed once more to trial by battle.
TAXATION OF INCOME FROM LITERARY PROPERTY OWNED
BY NONRESIDENT ALIENS"
COmm-,zSURATE with the practical limitations upon the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue's ability to collect moneys assessed,1 federal jurisdiction to
tax incomes in a given case is theoretically predicated upon a taxpayer's
connection with the United States in at least one of three ways: (1) by citi-
pressions" in the Taylor case are more prejudicial than more routine entries because- more
technical and therefore more impressive to a lay jury. Yet he would not exclude diagnostic
records on which "competent physicians would not differ." The tendency of app2l1ate
courts to determine the admissibility of a record in terms of its apparent probative value is
unfortunate. See statement by Clark, J. in Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 115 F.
(2d) 492, 496 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940): "The evidence would appear to be admissible for the
purpose, and its weight to be only ground for attack after admission.... ." "Whether . . .
some parts of this evidence should be omitted is preeminently a matter of adjustment as a
trial proceeds, and as to which precise directions from us could hardly be helpful." Thid.
The American Law Institute would give the trial judge discretionary control over
records which, among other things, "create substantial danger of undue prejudice," but
cautions that "evidence may not be rejected under this Rule merely because it is opinion
or hearsay." A. L. I., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) Rule 303. See also Rule 504.
Maguire approves this as "an adaptable -safeguard far superior to the unyielding principles
of exclusion fashioned by the majority in Hoffman v. Palmer [see note 9 supra]." Note
(1942) 56 HARv. L. REV. 458, 469.
42. Indeed, "No mention was made [in the entry] of the necessity for any special meas-
ures to prevent suicide." New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. (2d) 297, 302. In the
literature on the subject, suicidal impulses are associated, not with conversion hysteria,
but with "manic-depressive psychosis." See, e.g., Noi-s, MODER? CLUTICAL PSYCMAT"RY
(1934) 158-9, 394, 401.
* Rohmer v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 5 T. C., No. 22, June 6, 1945.
1. See 8 MIERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL IxcO.sE T-xxxr1oN (1942) § 45.03.
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zenship ;2 (2) by residence;3 or (3) by source of income.4 Since by definition
the taxation of nonresident aliens must always rest upon the last basis alone,
an in personam jurisdiction may not be claimed, as it may of citizens and
resident aliens, 5 which would enable levy upon earnings from all sources
whether foreign or domestic,6 but only an authority in rem to tax income
originating within this country.'
This power has been exercised, regardless of the possibilities of double
taxation,8 in each revenue act since that of 1866,9 when Congress first tapped
2. Cook v. Tait; 265 U. S. 47 (1924), (1925) 23 Micu. L. REV. 396; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 79 F. (2d) 245 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); cf. United States v. Bennett,
232 U. S. 299 (1914) (federal ezcise tax on use of foreign-built yacht never physically within
territorial jurisdiction of United States upheld on grounds that owner was United States
citizen and domiciled here); United States v. Goelet, 232 U. S. 293 (1914) (same type of
yacht as in Bennett case, supra, but owner, a citizen of United States, domiciled abroad;
power to tax upheld, but tax not applied through statutory construction); Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U. S. 37 (1920) (constitutionality of Oklahoma statute taxing income from oil leases
owned by nonresident of state upheld). See HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION or PROPERTY
AND INCOME (1933) 229 et seg.; Levitt, Income Tax Predicated upon Citizenship: Cook v. Tait
(1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 607; Notes (1923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 515, (1923) 8 IOWA L, BULL. 269.
3. Bowring v. Bowers, 24 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert denied, 277 U. S. 608
(1928).
4. Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Int. Rev., 279 U. S. 306 (1929);
Sabatini v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 98 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Lord Forres (Archibald
Williamson), 25 B. T. A. 154 (1932), (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 549; cf. Commonwealth v.
Radio Corp. of America, 299 Ky. 44, 184S. W. (2d) 250 (1944), (1945) 45 CoL. L. REV. 652.
See Note (1935) 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 103.
5. See Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 490 (Ct. Cl. 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U. S. 670 (1940); Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problem in Federal Taxa-
tion of Income (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 908; Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582.
6. Iir. REv. CODE §§ 11, 12,400,450 (1939). See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 (1943) §§ 29.11-
2, 29.11-3, 29.12-1, 29.211-1, 29.211-2; 8 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
(1942) § 45.03.
7. See cases cited supra note 4; cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199
U. S. 194 (1905); Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); People ex rel. Cerf v. Lynch, 237
App. Div. 283, 261 N. Y. Supp. 231 (3d Dep't 1932), aff'd without opinion, 262 N. Y. 549,
188 N. E. 59 (1933). See Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problem in Federal Taxation of
Income (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 908; Wurzel, Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxa-
tion (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 809; Note (1937) 50 HARV. L. REV. 704.
8. A nonresident alien is not exempt from taxation on his United States income on the
ground that he is subject to taxes on the same income by the nations of his citizenship or
residence. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933); 8 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IN-
cOME TAXATiON (1942) § 45.03. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes in Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730,
732 (1903): "No doubt it would be a great advantage to the country and to the individual
states if principles of taxation could be agreed upon which did not conflict with each other,
and a common scheme could be adopted by which taxation of substantially the same prop-
erty in two jurisdictions could be avoided."
Provision is made in the Internal Revenue Code for treaties with foreign nations re-
garding the taxation of income accruing to nonresident aliens in the United States. INT.
REV. CODE §§ 143b, 211(a)(1)(A) (1939). See U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 (1943) §§ 29.143-1,
29.211-7.
9. 14 STAT. 137 (1866). See note 10 infra.
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the vast sums annually paid to foreign investors by taxing their entire net
income from United States sources.'" Over the years, however, experience
proved the enforcement of a tax on all types of income impracticable, for
many earnings, such as those from capital gains, were capable of effective
concealment by persons having neither citizenship, residence, nor place of
business in this country.1 To relieve this situation, Congress in 1936 intro-
duced a policy of restricting the scope of the non-resident aliens' tax to
items of ready collectibility, while maintaining the same flow of revenue by
an increase in rates.12 Accordingly, Section 211 of the Internal Revenue
Code now imposes upon nonresident aliens not engaged in trade or business
within the United States a tax-subject to withholding at the source of
income 1'3---which is measured solely by "the amount received . . . as inter-
est . . . , dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensa-
tions, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or
periodical gains, profits, and income .... , 14 Whether income of a nonresi-
10. An income tax was proposed during the War of 1812 but not adopted. MAO1LL
AND MIAGUIRE, CASES ON THE LAW OF TAxATi.€o (1940) 567. The first federal income tax
vas passed by Congress in 1861 to meet governmental expenditures caused by the Civil War.
12 STAT. 309 (1861). A tax was levied on "the annual income of every person residing in the
United States . . . from any . . . source whatever" and on "the income, rents, or divi-
dends accruing upon any property, securities or stocks oned in the United States by any
citizen of the United States residing abroad. . . ." 12 STrT. 309 (1861). Nonresident aliens
with United States income were not mentioned.
The 1861 statute was superseded before any taxes were collected under it by an act
effective December 1, 1862. 12 STAT. 473 (1862). Nonresident aliens were again ignored.
Nor were they included in the 1865 tax. 13 STAT. 479 (1865).
In 1866, however, it was provided for the first time: ". . . and a like tax Ehall be levied,
collected, and paid annually upon the gains, profits, and income of every business, trade, or
profession carried on in the United States by persons residing .%ithout the United States,
not citizens thereof." 14 STAT. 137 (1866). This provision -as continued in the 1867 act,
14 STAT. 478 (1867) and in that of 1870, 16 STAT. 257 (1870). The 1870 act expired by its
terms on the last day of 1871. 16 STAT. 257 (1870). The act of 1894, 28 ST.AT. 553 (1S94)
contained the same provision as the 1866 act, supra. The later acts contained provisions of
increasing complexity. See, e.g., 39 STAT. 756 (1916); 40 STAT. 1062, 1066, 1067, 1063,
1069-70 (1918); 42 STAT. 227, 233, 239, 242 (1921); 43 STAT. 253, 264, 269, 271, 272 (1924).
See note 14 infra.
11. See Angell, The Nonresident Alien: A Problem in Federal Taxation of Income (1936)
36 COL. L. REv. 908.
12. Revenue Act of 1936, §§ 211-219, 49 STAT. 1648, 1714-6 (1936).
13. INT. REV. CODE § 143(b) (1939) states: "All persons, in whatever capacity acting,
. . . having the control, receipt, custody, disposal or payment of ... fixed or determinable
annual or periodical gains, profits, and income (but only to the extent that any of the above
items constitutes gross income from sources within the United States), of any nonrecident
alien individual . . . shall . . . deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains,
profits, and income a tax equal to 30 percentum thereof.. .. "
14. Ir. REv. CODE § 211(a)(1)(A) (1939) (emphasis supplied). Section 211 divides
nonresident alien individuals into three groups: (1) those not engaged in trade or businmes
within the United States at any time during the taxable year and deriving during the ta%able
year not more than $15,400 gross amount of fixed or determinable annual or periodical in-
come from sources within the United States; (2) those not engaged in trade or business, but
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.dent alien without a trade or business here is taxable therefore depends upon
the answers to two questions: is it (1) from a United States source and (2)
-within the classification of "annual or periodical"?
The Congressional failure specifically to list royalties as taxable income,
though not regarded by the Bureau as a meaningful omission, 16 has invited
foreign authors and inventors to resist application of the tax to profits
realized from use of their intellectual property in this country.1" In the most
Tecent of these attempts, Rohmer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
17
an author who was both a citizen and resident of Great Britain sold to
McFadden Publications, Inc., through a literary agent in the United States
the exclusive right to publish serially his novel The Island of Fu Manchu in
magazines and newspapers. All other rights, such as those of publication in
book form or of production as a motion picture or stage play, were retained.
The consideration paid was not in the usual royalty form of a stated per-
centage of the retail price of each copy sold, but was a flat sum of $10,000.
When a deficiency was determined in Rohmer's income tax return, he took
the position that the $10,000 was derived from a sale of personal property,
-which not being within the category of "annual or periodical gains, profits,
-deriving more than $15,400 from sources within the United States; (3) those who at anytime
-during the taxable year are engaged in trade or business within the United States.
Members of class (1) are now subject to a 30% tax on gross income of fixed or determi-
,nable annual or periodical nature from sources within the United States. INT. REV. CODE
§ 119 (1939) defines income which is to be regarded as emanating from the United States.
*See note 20 infra. Members of class (2) are allowed certain deductions, and the tax is com-
puted under INT. REv. CODE §§ 11, 12, 450 (repealed) (1939), at the same rates as it is for
,citizens and residents. The tax under Sections 11 and 12 in no case, however, shall be less
than 30%. Members of class (3) are allowed certain deductions and taxed in accordance
with INT. REv. CODE §§ 11, 12, 450 (repealed) (1939) on their net income originating from
-all sources within the United States, not merely that within the category of "annual or per-
-odical," described by INT. REV. CODE § 211 (a)(1)(A) (1939). See INT. REv. CODE § 211(b)
(1939); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 (1943) § 29.211-7.
Members of classes (1) and (2), supra, are the subjects of discussion in this note. Their
taxable income is described by the Treasury regulation thus: "The gross income of a non-
resident alien individual not engaged in trade or business within the United States at any
-time during the taxable year, whether such alien comes within section 211(a) [not engaged
in trade or business, aggregate amount received from United States sources during taxable
year less than $15,400] or section 211(c) [aggregate amount more than $15,400], is gross
income from sources within the United States consisting of fixed or determinable annual or
periodical income."
15. "Specific items of fixed or determinable annual or periodical income are enumerated
in the Internal Revenue Code as interest (except interest on deposits with persons carrying
-on the banking business), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensa-
tion, remunerations, and emoluments, but other fixed or determinable annual or periodical
gains, profits, and income are also subject to the tax, as, for instance, royalties." U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111 (1943) § 29.211-7(a) (emphasis supplied).
16. See cases cited infra notes 17, 22, 23, 35.
17. 5 T. C., No. 22, June 6, 1945.
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and income" 1 is not taxable to a nonresident alien ;' or, alternatively, that
if the money were not derived from a sale, it was nevertheless not "annual
or periodical" proceeds, because it was paid in a lump sum. On appeal from
the Commissioner's determination, the Tax Court of the United States
rejected both arguments, however, and held the money to be income taxable
to Rohmer.
It is conclusively determined by the Internal Revenue Code that income
from the use of American copyrights in this country is income having its
source in the United States,"' but the court's reasoning to include Rohmer's
payment within the scope of Section 21121 is not equally inviolable. Follow-
ing the leading Sabatini case 22 and other cases 2 which used the same ra-
tionalization, the court leaned upon the convenient conceptualism that
"There was no transfer of title necessary to a completed sale," " but merely
a license to use the work in question for a limited purpose. Not having been
paid for a transfer of "ownership," the $10,000 was "in the nature of" a
royalty, a category of earnings institutionally remitted at intervals, and
therefore in this case taxable. This view, logically sound if one accepts the
18. INT. REv. CODE §§ 211(a)(1)(A), 211(c) (1939).
19. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 (1943) § 29.212-1(a) states in part: "His [a nonrezident alien
not engaged in trade or business within the United States at any time during the taxable
year] taxable income does not include profits derived from the effecting of transactions in the
United States in stocks, securities, or commodities (including hedging transactions) through
a resident broker, commission agent, or custodian, or profits derived from the cale within
the United States of personal property or real property located therein."
20. Ix. REv. CODE § 119(a)(4) (1939) directs that "The folloving items of groz:3 in-
come shall be treated as income from sources vdthin the United States: ... (4) Rra:;TALs
AND RoyALTrs.--Rentals or royalties from property located in the United States or from
kny interest in such property, including rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege
of using in the United States, patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas, good Vill,
trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other like property... ." Income from Eales of
personal property may be derived from sources wholly within, or wholly vithout, or partly
within and partly without the United States as determined in accordance vith "rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commissioner (of Internal Revenue] vith the approval of
the Secretary [of the Treasury]." Ixr. REV. CODE §§ 119(a)(6), 119(e) (1939). Sae U. S.
Treas. Reg. 111 (1943) § 29.119-12. Cf. Korfund Co., Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 1 T. C.
1180 (1943); Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co., 43 B. T. A. 297 (1941), aIJ'd sub. nor. Comm'r
of Int. Rev. v. Piedras Negras Broadcasting Co., 127 F. (2d) 260 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
21. INT. REv. CODE § 211 (1939). See note 14 supra.
22. Sabatini v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 98 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
23. Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Estate of Mexander Mar-.
ton, 47 B. T. A. 184 (1942); Irving Berlin, 42 B. T. A. 668 (1940); cf. Goldsmith v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., 143 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774 (1944). See I. T.
2624, XI-1 Cum. BULL. 122 (Bur. of Int. Rev., 1932); I. T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 131,
134 (Bur. of Int. Rev., 1933); T. B. R. 29, 1 Cms. BULL. 230 (Bur. of Int. Rev., 1919).
24. Rohmer v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 5 T. C., No. 22, June 6, 1945, at 4. This sentence
w.as taken verbatim by the Tax Court in the Rohmer case from the opinion in Sabatini v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 98 F. (2d) 753, 755 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). It was alo quoted (incorrectly)
in Irving Berlin, 42 B. T. A. 668, 675 (1940). As authority for the sentence, the circuit court
in the Sabatini case, supra, cited Whitfield v. United States, 92 U. S. 165 (1875), presumably
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unexpressed major premise that the attributes of literary property are by
nature indivisible and hence incapable of separate sale,25 nevertheless neg-
lects the possibility of an also tenable "bundle of rights" theory of copy-
right,26 under which each right given by the Copyright Act 2 may be indi-
vidually transferred, if the proprietor sees fit, as completely as a fee-simple
estate in realty. The consideration for the conveyance is then not the
theoretical sum of separate payments, but an integral, and hence nontaxable,
compensation. The Copyright Act, in fact, supports this theory by segre-
gating into lettered paragraphs the various types of monopoly afforded an
author through registration of a copyrightable work.2 On occasion, more-
over, .both the courts 2 and the Bureau itself 10 have referred to the "sale"
of partial rights under copyrights and patents.
referring to the statement in that case, "A sale of personal property, when completed, trans-
fers to the purchaser the title of the property sold." Id. at 170. By taking as their minor
premise that no transfer of title took place, the courts in the Sabalini, Rohmer, and Berlin
cases, supra, were able to achieve their results with impeccable logic.
25. See New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Goldwyn
Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); I. T. 2735, X11-2 CuM.
BULL. 131, 134 (Bur. of Int. Rev., 1933).
26. Compare 1 LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY (1938) pp. 1-11. Ladas gives an excellent summary of the various theories of the
nature of copyright. See also White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1, 18-20
(1908).
27. 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1940). See note 28 infra.
28. "SECTION 1. ExcLUSIVE RIGHTS AS TO COPYRIGHTED WORKS.-Any person entitled
thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any
other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work;
to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt
it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a
work of art;
(c) To deliver or authorize the delivery of the copyrighted work in public for profit if
it be a lecture, sermon, address, or similar production;
(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be a
dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any record
whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof
by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited,
performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, pro-
duce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever;
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition
and for the purposes of public performance for profit; and for the purposes set forth in sub-
section (a) hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any
system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be re-
corded and from which it may be read or reproduced ... " 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S.
C. § 1 (1940).
29. Goldsmith v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 143 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 774 (19,14).
30. I. T. 1231, I-1 Cr m. BULL. 206 (Bur. of Int. Rev., 1922); I. T. 2736, XII-2 CuM.
BULL. 190 (Bur. of Int. Rev., 1933).
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NOTES
The choice between these concepts of copyright, for the purposes of the
Rozimer problem, however, should be based upon the governmental policy
to be thereby implemented, for the choice predetermines the result.3' Since,
in addition to the "sale" theory, 32 the courts have refuted the arguments
that payments for literary property are damages for violation of the right
of privacy 33 or are given in return for the personal service of writing per-
formed abroad, 34 the taxability to nonresident aliens of all income, regardless
of its form, from transfers of less than whole interests in copyrights and
patents appears settled. Presumably, to immunize the income from a
transfer, it must be so complete that the transferee's name is substitutible for
the transferor's on the registration books of the Copyright Office.3 5 That
this result is to be approved from a fiscal point of view follows from the fact
that Congress concededly has power to tax all intra-United States income
and has done less than this in Section 211 as interpreted by the courts.
Moreover, the taxation of earnings from patent and copyrights, unlike the
taxation of income from money investments, can not drive authors or in-
ventors to deal in other countries, for the non-use of intellectual property
here obviously does not increase the yield elsewhere. It might be well, never-
theless, for Section 211 to be amended to make the present case-law interpre-
tation explicit, for the necessity of manipulable concepts and the appear-
ance of judicial legislation would then be removed.
DUDLEY L. MinmRt
31. FR n , LAWAND THE MODERN MIND (1930) c. III; McDougal, Fuller . TI:ePAnri-
can Legal Realists: An Intervention (1941) 50 YALE L. J. S27; Lasswell and McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest (1943) 52 YALt L. J.
203. Cf. Judge Frank's reasoning in United Shipyards, Inc. v. Hoey, 131 F. (2d) 525 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1942).
32. Rohmer v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 5 T. C., No. 22, June 6, 1945; see alco cases cited
supra notes 22, 23.
33. Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805, S07-9 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The court dictin-
guished damages and consideration by saying that the former is given to compensate for
violation of a right after the violation; the latter is given to compensate before the violation.
The argument advanced by the taxpayer springs from Warren and Brandeis, TIe Rigkt of
Privacy (1890) 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, a classic work asserting the hypothesis that copyright
is based on the author's moral right of privacy in his work.
34. E. Phillips Oppenheim, 31 B. T. A. 563 (1934).
35. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 139 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A.
2d, 1944); Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 140 F. (2d) 339 (App. D.
C. 1944).
f Member of the third-year class.
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